What men do in aircraft and why machines can do it better.
Cost-effectiveness. The effectiveness of a system is tied not only to its combat effectiveness (i.e., ability to destroy targets), but also to such factors as theater integration effectiveness and costs of acquisition and operation. Expensive acquisitions programs are shut down during budget cuts, operationally expensive weapons aren't maintained at full readiness, and weapons that aren't used in training usually aren't trusted by battlefield commanders during wartime.
Regardless of their capability, expensive, complex systems are often discarded in favor of cheap, simple systems that can get the job done more reliably. 3 System costs are also of great concern. Since the Gulf War, commanders have demonstrated a clear preference for using million-dollar cruise missiles instead of manned aircraft to carry out strategic attacks. After all, captured or killed aircrews are extremely costly, not only in terms of public relations and morale, but also in terms of dollar-replacement value (it costs millions of dollars to train and maintain pilots). Cruise missiles, then, have demonstrated just how expensive it is to use manned combat aerial vehicles.
UCAV systems can provide all of the capability of manned aircraft with total costs below those of cruise missiles. While the unit acquisition cost will be a fraction that of manned vehicles, the most significant savings with UCAVs are expected to accrue from how they are used in training and operations. I will begin the analysis of UCAV cost-effectiveness by showing how proposed UCAV systems compare to current systems on cost. Then I will provide a survey of current technology to show just how realistic UCAV proposals are. I will touch on the airframe, engines, flight control, payload, communications, and targeting technologies. I will also look at the issue of survivability and the use of UCAVs in training and operations. Finally, I
will survey the state-of-the-art in UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) systems, and show where UCAV systems will take us. In a sense, this entire paper is about cost-effectiveness, since it shows how unmanned vehicles can be both cheaper and better.
Precision interdiction mission. Ground-attack sorties used to be carried out by small fighters with dumb bombs. Later, stealth bombers with precision-guided bombs took over the role.
Today the most popular interdiction vehicle is the cruise missile. Presumably, the predilection of commanders for cruise missiles is an indication that once all cost, risk, and effectiveness factors are taken into account, cruise missiles are the most cost-effective interdiction vector.
UCAVs improve upon the already preferred vector of cruise missiles by both reducing sortie costs and increasing capabilities. The most popular specification for UCAVs is a vehicle that costs under $15 million and can deliver two 1000lb munitions with the same reliability as two cruise missiles (which have a 1000lb payload). 4 The current acquisition price of cruise missiles is as low as $750,000. Even if we assume the worst-case UCAV price of $15 million, and add a generous $100,000 charge per sortie over cruise missiles (about par for manned aircraft), UCAVs are still cheaper to use than cruise missiles up to an attrition rate of 5% per sortie. And as we will see, UCAVs should be more survivable than either manned aircraft or cruise missiles. Just as important as raw cost are capabilities. Expendable cruise missiles can't carry the expensive sensors and countermeasures the reusable UCAVs can. Cruise missiles are also unable to strike certain types targets, like those sheltered in valleys, or pop-up targets encountered after they are programmed. But UCAVs can attack with the abandon of a cruise missile and with all of the capabilities of a manned aircraft.
Air-superiority mission. There is no clear unmanned alternative to a UCAV that can foray into enemy territory and evade enemy air defenses while shooting down enemy aircraft. One costbenefit analysis might suggest that as long as the UCAV destroys no less than its own value in military hardware, it is cost-effective. This is easy, since UCAVs are supposed to cost less than one-third of a manned aircraft, meaning an advanced enemy could shoot down three UCAVs for every manned fighter it loses and we would still break even. More importantly, manned air superiority fighters offer little in comparison to UCAVs. Since modern fighter pilots rarely make visual contact with the enemy (indeed, the goal of air superiority is beyond-visual-range engagement), the value of a pair of eyeballs in the cockpit is negligible. Furthermore, as will be explained in the Survivability section, it appears unlikely that manned aircraft could keep attrition rates below UCAVs on the same air-superiority missions. Communications. "Robust, jam-proof communications is the critical issue," said Larry Birckelbaw, program manager for the DARPA UCAV program. 15 One of the great prospects for UCAV operations is the ability to form a distributed network in the sky that coordinates diverse sensors and weapons in real-time. Although they will function autonomously, it is likely that some amount of operator input and supervision will always be required for UCAVs. At a minimum, UCAVs will have to receive data on threats, flight path and waypoints, and target locations and type. Weapons release will require confirmation by a human operator, and UCAVs will have to carry a reliable self-destruct mechanism not only to prevent collateral damage should they go out of control, but also to safeguard sensitive technology and the theater data they carry onboard. They will also have to receive and respond to queries for location and status. UCAVs might also broadcast intelligence on popup targets as they are encountered.
All of this requires substantial communications bandwidth-"the most precious commodity of electromagnetic radiation) through radar antennas, and will also be equipped with synthetic aperture radar. 23 These data can be directly integrated to pick out targets and assign them to UCAVs. Of course, the UCAVs will carry their own sensors capable of detecting popup threats.
But the real power of these next-generation systems is the ability of massively capable off-board sensors to provide information needed by the quiet and simple UCAVs.
Survivability.
The most significant factor in determining the cost-effectiveness of a UCAV system is its survivability. Aircraft that venture into enemy airspace encounter formidable air defenses consisting of radar-guided anti-aircraft artillery, surface-to-air missiles, and fighter-plane interceptors. The ability to cope effectively with these threats will largely determine the attrition rate of UCAVs, which will in turn affect their attractiveness in comparison to throwaway cruise missiles and manned fighters. It appears that UCAVs are particularly competitive in this respect.
Because they are reusable, UCAVs can afford to carry more onboard sensors and intelligence to deal with threats than can cruise missiles. Also, because they are more stealthy and maneuverable, UCAVs are fundamentally more survivable than manned aerial vehicles. UCAVs will depend on offboard real-time intelligence to alert them to known threats so that they can take appropriate countermeasures. They will also carry their own sensors for the enemy radar used to detect them and guide weapons. They may even be equipped with their own short-range radar to precisely track incoming threats like missiles and aircraft (again, relying on wavelengths that are absorbed quickly by the atmosphere in order to avoid giving away their own existence to enemy sensors) and take end-game evasive action. Countermeasures available to UCAVs include signature reduction, jammers, deceivers, expendables, and tactics. Radar and infrared signatures are of primary concern. Acoustic and electromagnetic signatures are also giveaways, but the former is not of much use against a highsubsonic or supersonic vehicle, and the latter is suppressed as much as possible through radio silence.
Radar. The radar signature of an aircraft is summed up in its Radar Cross Section (RCS, denoted by σ). Range and σ are the only two factors that can be controlled to reduce susceptibility to detection by radar. 24 While σ varies with the direction from which an aircraft is viewed, it can be substantially reduced overall by changing the reflection and absorption
properties of the skin of the airframe. The shape of the airplane can be modified to reflect incoming rays away from their source, and some enhancements to the skin increase internal absorption of radiation. Another stealth tactic is to increase the impedance of the skin by applying a voltage to it.
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Jamming can be used to mask a plane's RCS. By broadcasting noise across the frequencies an enemy radar scans, it is unable to pick out the relatively faint echo of the aircraft itself. In general, this requires substantial power and so the mission is carried out by dedicated jamming aircraft in a sortie. However, not only are dedicated jammers susceptible to HARMs, but also their position can be triangulated by two disjoint radar antennas.
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More effective than blind jamming is deception, or spoofing. Some examples of spoofing techniques that use relatively low power include "range-gate pull-off" and "inverse con-scan"
(for conical scan tracking radars). To execute a range-gate pull-off, the spoofing transmitter 24 Ball, p.378. A radar with power P and antenna gain G will have a power density of A is the receiving area of the antenna) meaning that the lower its RCS and the greater its range from a radar, the harder it is to detect. (usually between 1m and 1mm). (There are 4π steradians in a sphere.) 25 Ball, p.233, 290 26 Nevertheless, Ball notes, "All forms of noise jamming are generally most effective if several jammers are scattered geographically and used simultaneously. With several jammers in different directions, the PPI (plane position indicator) picture can be so confusing that the radar operator has difficulty determining the direction to any one of the jammers" (p.282). However, as computerized signal analysis matures, it will become more difficult to deceive radars in this manner.
gradually amplifies the radar signal returned by an aircraft. Once the spoof signal is sufficiently high to have captured the radar's gain control, it is slowly delayed, making the apparent range increase. Finally, with the radar focussed far away from the real aircraft, it can be shut off.
Inverse con-scan is used against radars that track a target by looking side to side in order to maximize their signal. As they scan to one side, the spoofing transmitter boosts the signal, making the tracker continue off to that side and lose lock.
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Expendables can also be used to stimulate and distract enemy radars. These include towed and miniature air-launched decoys that mimic the RCS of real aircraft. Chaff-electric dipoles cut to precise lengths and dispensed into the turbulent air behind a plane-can simulate a target for a given wavelength of radar. 28 Also, low-level flight can make radar tracking almost impossible because of both the ground clutter and the effects of multiple reflections from the ground.
Infrared. The infrared signature of an aircraft is much more difficult to suppress-the total heat radiated by an aircraft at a given speed and engine power is pretty much fixed. 29 Attempts are always made in design to minimize the temperature generated by engines, aerodynamic heating at high speeds, and the reflectivity and emissivity of the air frame. Yet it is difficult to counter weapons that track an infrared signature because they can do so passively.
IR countermeasures include flares, towed decoys, lasers, and deceivers. Unfortunately, flares are not effective against modern heat-seeking missiles because they can't truly match the spectrum, brightness, or size of a real vehicle. Frequency modulated infrared deceivers could confuse mechanically scanned seekers, but won't work against newer missiles with entirely electronic seekers. Fortunately, there are other options. Northrup Grumman, for example, has tested production missile warning systems 30 that track the ultraviolet emissions of a missile's solid propellant exhaust with sufficient accuracy to aim an infrared laser at the seeker, effectively blinding infrared missiles. Such countermeasures could be installed in UCAVs. 27 Ball, p.282 28 The dipoles must be cut to ½ the wavelength of the radar being decoyed, and 2
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. λ σ dipoles must be dispensed to mimic an RCS of σ to a radar of wavelength λ. Ball, p.299. 29 It is proportional to temperature to the fourth power. Ball, p.238. 30 E.g., the AAR-54. See "DIRCM (Directed Infrared Countermeasures)," AW&ST, 26-Oct-98, p.44.
Evasion. Evasive maneuvers can be used against both missiles and manned fighters at close ranges. Even with simple evasion algorithms, UCAVs should be able to evade more effectively than manned aerial vehicles, primarily because they can pull more than twice as many Gs in any direction.
Missiles either fly in direct pursuit of a target, or else try to follow a straight-line, "lead" collision course to intercept a target following a fixed trajectory (as shown in he does too much the missile may never overtake its target. These are complicated tradeoffs and won't be further analyzed here. We will simply point out that when a missile's turning capacity exceeds the breakeven threshold, it can almost surely intercept the vehicle; if it falls short of that threshold, the vehicle can almost surely evade even if the missile maintains lock.
In practice, most anti-air missiles are roughly three times as fast as their targets. According to one source, "Anti-aircraft missiles are usually designed with a factor of three margin in lateral acceleration over that of the target aircraft, although a few missiles have acceleration capability as high as 80G." 32 As currently envisioned, UCAVs that can't break the lock of a lethal, 80G missile would probably succumb to it. (Note that by the same analysis, manned aircraft can't expect to survive locked missiles of even 30Gs.) However, the addition of the numerous countermeasures already considered may balance the equation substantially in favor of the UCAVs. On the other hand, hypersonic UCAVs, if developed, could probably outrun any threat.
Other factors. Two final tactics for increasing UCAV survivability are low-level and As has been suggested, UCAVs can perform not only high-risk missions, but probably even standard manned missions at a fraction of the cost of manned systems. The use of remote operators for UCAV systems yields many benefits. Some proposals would put operators on manned C² aircraft in the theater. For example, an F-15E Weapons Systems Operator could direct a strike package of perhaps a dozen UCAVs while the pilot uses the F-15's radar to illuminate targets from a distance. 35 In concepts like this, UCAVs become more like offboard smart weapons than an unmanned strike force. More popular, however, is the concept of a UCAV command center far from the forward edge of the battle area. In this scenario, well rested specialists with powerful equipment receive battlefield intelligence and direct UCAVs in enemy territory through the communications web. The vehicles themselves are expected to be capable of sustained rates of three sorties per day, with a surge rate of five sorties per day. They can be flown directly into the theater or supplied by C-5 and C-17 transports. Works, for one, is known to be engaged in additional black UAV projects. 41 The Navy is also studying a UAV to loiter carrying not only reconnaissance but also missile defense packages and stand-off weapons.
"A good indicator to watch is where aerospace companies are investing their research money.
Across the board, they are investigating the use of high-performance, pilotless vehicles for the most dangerous aerial combat jobs." 43 The technology exists today to produce UCAVs capable of effectively carrying out both air-superiority and interdiction missions. Moreover, UCAVs have the potential to be more cost-effective than any other aerial system currently owned or planned by the armed forces.
The future. "Countries conform to the will of their enemies when the penalty of not conforming exceeds the cost of conforming."
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In 2013, the international community has come to a head against a belligerent, fundamentalist rogue state. Possessing a massive and modern military, as well as a small but demonstrated nuclear arsenal, it invades a resource-rich neighboring country. Once again, the United States leads the military response, first to halt its offensive, and then to destroy its military capability.
But this enemy is not stupid. It carefully studied past American counter-offensives, and is wellprepared to fight a war for air and space superiority. Preliminary stand-off missile attacks aimed to destroy its C³I infrastructure, but instead demonstrated the vulnerability of cruise-missiles and the survivability of the enemy's distributed systems. Now the world braces for an inevitably bloody and protracted air war. Or so they think….
It is past midnight when a forward enemy radar station detects the beginning of an air assault.
A passive listening post detects bursts of radiation emitted by several aircraft cruising at high altitude, about 80km away. An active radar confirms that these are incoming Global Hawk
UAVs, equipped to provide communications relay for the assault. It also detects AWACS and JSTARS aircraft loitering at 150km. The distributed communications network alerts the enemy air defenses, scrambling air intercept fighters and airborne jamming drones. The enemy's own AWACS stand off a safe distance to command their side of the battle.
An enemy radar operator sits smugly inside a bunker. His antennas serve as a beacon for anti-radiation missiles, but he is a safe distance from them. 45 Besides, antennas are cheaper than missiles. He maxes out the radar power and begins a more focussed scan to try to find the stealth craft he knows must accompany the invasion. Suddenly, his eyes widen in surprise and he zeros in on a blip. It is a small aircraft diving in on him, and it's less than 3km
away. He doesn't have time to think.
One of the remote JSTARS operators did a synthetic aperture radar scan of the vicinity of this radar post and picked out the bunker. He passed the exact coordinates and target information to the remote UCAV Operations Command Queue. From there it was passed to the nearest leading interdiction UCAV, which didn't appear on radar until it popped up from its terrain-following patrol course, rolled over, and opened its weapon bays, ten seconds from the target. Confirming its location and the target, a UCAV operator authorizes weapons release. The UCAV drops a cluster bomb on the antenna array, followed by a penetrating munition right into the bunker at point-blank range. Then it closes its weapon bay doors, rolls over, and climbs into the night.
The enemy's C³I headquarters cannot see what is causing its forward radars to flicker out.
Meanwhile, enemy AWACS operators are frantically trying to decipher the noise and blips flooding their screens. They get glimpses of a few aircraft loitering deep in their own territory at altitudes of 15km, and hoards of others zooming in at diverse altitudes and speeds. 46 But they struggle to fix these signals long enough to pinpoint any target in particular. They send their air interceptors after the closest visible targets.
No sooner have the air interceptors pointed to engage the Global Hawks than their cockpits light up with missile warnings. Some of the squadron jets turn on their own radars to discover a swarm of planes closing in at Mach 3 from 40km away. The enemy fighters turn to engage this new threat and evade the missiles launched against them. However, they are outnumbered at least 2 to 1, and have trouble locking onto the stealthy air-superiority UCAVs at a distance long enough to get a missile off. Several enemy planes go down before they succeed in engaging the UCAVs with short-range infrared missiles-a late-generation, thrust-vectoring, Russian model.
The UCAVs stop their attack and begin to passively track the enemy missile exhaust trails and ready countermeasures. Powerful onboard computers determine when a vehicle is threatened.
When a locked projectile comes within 5 seconds of potential impact with a craft, the UCAV accelerates into a rolling bank to maintain a vector perpendicular to it, peaking the maneuver at up to 20Gs. Even these missiles can't keep up. They either break apart trying or else selfdestruct as they lose their lock. The enemy interceptors get a moment of respite as the UCAVs are occupied evading the missiles. However, only one UCAV goes down-tracked by three missiles simultaneously from different directions, it is unable to outmaneuver them all.
The UCAVs have lost a lot of speed evading the missiles, and are now within gun range of the enemy interceptors. The enemy fighters kick in their afterburners and go after them, falling into ideal pursuit positions behind them. It looks like the relatively simple onboard artificial intelligence won't be able to save the UCAVs from the skilled pilots in the Manned Combat Aerial Vehicles. However, the UCAVs aren't oblivious to the threat as they activate their shortrange radar and IFF (Identify Friend or Foe system). Tracking the enemy fighters, they begin to pull and roll, following the same simple tactics they used to evade the missiles. The enemy pilots strain themselves to the point of blacking out trying to stay on the UCAVs. But the UCAVs can maneuver twice as hard, and easily flit out of range as other UCAVs re-engage the fighters from a distance with air-to-air missiles. Soon, the distracted interceptors are falling out of the sky.
The few that remain of the original squadron try to flee the encounter, only to be chased down by the tireless UCAVs.
By now, some of the Global Hawks, the primary communications link in the offensive, are lost to long-range air-to-air missiles. Also, the enemy has activated airborne and powerful ground-based jammers. Without a direct line of communication to receive target and weapons authorizations, the UCAVs would turn to fly home. However, they are still within line-of-sight with the AWACS, and when they lose range with that, fall back on satellite communication links.
Even if that link is disrupted or jammed, the passive Darkstar reconnaissance UAVs orbiting high overhead can assume an active line-of-sight communications relay role. Now the battle moves further behind the enemy lines. With no other interceptors to contend with, the air-superiority UCAVs speed towards the enemy AWACS. As they do, SAM sites wake up and begin launching against the interdictors. The UCAVs leave their trajectory as necessary to evade the missiles. The vast majority succeed in doing so and return to their assigned path. However, not only every missile launch, but also every radar scan and jamming emission is detected by multiple agents in the U.S. airborne network, and broadcast to the central command. There the data is sorted and compiled and made instantly available to operators, who assign the new targets to interdiction UCAVs. By the time the enemy on the ground hears an approaching jet, it will have received authorization and be releasing its munitions.
As dawn breaks, the U.S. has struck all of its strategic targets. The enemy has lost its entire air interceptor force, as well as most of its active air defense network. It has expended enormous quantities of ordnance and succeeded only in destroying a small number of unmanned aerial vehicles, none worth more than $15 million.
Conclusion.
The assumptions in this paper have been very conservative. All performance figures listed here are unclassified, and it is very likely that better performance has been achieved with secret systems. (Nevertheless, given the difficulties just being ironed out in the unclassified UAV programs, it seems unlikely that a UCAV as described here has been produced yet, even in secret.)
In all of the scenarios and cost analysis the enemy has been given the benefit of the doubt.
Interdiction and air-superiority UCAVs have the potential to transform conventional war. If the United States were equipped with a massive UCAV force, it is unthinkable that any nation would undertake a full-scale offensive in which it might be opposed by such an overwhelming phalanx of essentially expendable fighters.
